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Abstract—This paper proposes a mapping tool for selectively 
mitigate radiation-induced Single Event Transient phenomena 
within the silicon structure of Microsemi RTG4 Radiation 
hardened Flash-based FPGAs. Experimental results on three 
benchmark circuits demonstrated effective SET mitigation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE aggressive scaling trend in the nanometer technologies 
has significantly impacted the rates of Single Event 
Transients (SETs) faults within electronic circuits. When 
Flash-based FPGA devices are considered, the main concern is 
related to radiation-induced voltage glitches or SETs in the 
combinational logic. SETs may propagate through the circuit 
logic and be sampled by register or memory elements. If 
latched, they provoke single or multiple errors depending on 
the fan-out stems from the radiation-affected point.  
The junction charge collection mechanism is the basic 
mechanism of the SET generation. When a charged particle 
crosses a junction area, it generates an amount of current that 
will cause a voltage glitch of elevated magnitude. The voltage 
glitch propagates through logic and routing resources for 
several logic levels and the SET may become 
indistinguishable from normal signals. The transient pulse, 
after propagating through the logic, can be sampled by a 
storage element creating a bit-flip, also called Single Event 
Upsets (SEUs), that can be propagated through the circuit up 
to the outputs and leading to an error.  
Recent experiments performed in Flash-based FPGAs show an 
evident SET pulse width and amplitude modulation through 
the traversed routing and logic cells. In particular, the 
experiments performed in [2] [3] shows that the final SET 
observed at the input of a storage element, is always 
dependent on the propagation phenomena. As described in [4] 
the SET phenomena can be described in two phases: the 
generation of the SET due to a particle-strike into a sensitive 
node and the subsequent pulse propagation to the input of a 
user memory element, typically a Flip-Flop. The initial stages 
is correspondent to the formation of the SET pulse shape, its 
characteristics depend on different factors principally 
including the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of the affecting 
particle, the incidence angle and the technology. In case the 
initial SET starts the propagation through the first logic states, 
the further propagation until the first encountered Flip-Flop is 
affected by different electrical phenomena that may change 
the SET pulse width broadening or filtering it in relation to the 
traversed routing and logic cells. Thus, it is today mandatory 
to evaluate and measure the effective SET pulse propagation 
so the most effective mitigation techniques can be adopted 
without additional timing penalties.  
The protection of the user memory and registers against these 
errors required the adoption of several mitigation solutions 
that have been previously proposed such as Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) and Error Correction Code (ECC). 
However, these techniques were not able to efficiently protect 
circuits versus SET [5][6][7][8]. Thanks to the technology 
characterization performed by means of electrical pulse 
injection and radiation tests, analytical methods for the 
modeling and the mitigation of multiple SETs has been 
recently proposed. These methodologies have been effectively 
tested through heavy-ions experimental radiation test, 
evaluating the mitigation capabilities of place and route-based 
SET mitigation algorithm we proposed in [9][10].  
On the other side, in order to cope with the increasing 
aerospace requirements in relation to the Total Ionization 
Dose (TID), a new radiation-hardened Flash-based FPGA 
family, RTG4, has been recently manufactured [11]. The main 
advantage of this Flash-based FPGA technology is to 
guarantee a TID tolerance higher that 100 krad thanks to the 
complementary or C-Flash, configuration cell that, as 
demonstrated in  [12], is able to tolerate higher level of 
Ionization Dose rather then the previous N-Flash. When 
transient radiation effects are considered, the major advantage 
of the RTG4 family is the availability of embedded SEU and 
SET mitigation scheme that rely on Triplicated Flip-Flop 
architecture and on internal SET mitigation scheme. Although 
the advantages provided by the RTG4 device family are 
relevant, the nowadays implementation tools do not provide an 
effective manageable of the SET mitigation solution since the 
implementation tool does not allow the designer to effectively 
select the proper redundancy and SET filtering setup.  
The main contribution of the present work is a new mapper 
algorithm able to selectively introduce SET-filtering scheme 
while optimizing the circuit performance and reducing the 
overall SET sensitivity. In details, the SET-filtering of the 
proposed approach is applied selectively to the relevant logic 
gate thus reducing the sensitive area and the performance 
degradation. This represents an enormous benefit versus 
previously used implementation tools that apply SET-filtering 
and guard-gate for all the user memory or Flip-Flop resources. 
Besides, the algorithm, which has been implemented as a 
software tool, is based on the elaboration of the RTG4 cell 
library and it is interfaced with the available tools.  
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II. BACKGROUND ON RTG4 ARCHITECTURE  
The RTG4 Flash-based FPGA technology is based on an 
array of Flash-technology based radiation tolerant logic 
elements embedding some hard ASIC blocks such as RAM 
memory modules and DSP blocks. All the elements are 
clustered inside the fabric and interconnected by a clustered 
routing architecture. The embedded registers have the 
possibility to mitigate Single Event Transients (SETs) while 
memories have a built-in error detection and correction 
mechanism (EDAC). The major resources of the RTG4 FPGA 
architecture are: logic elements, interface logic elements and 
I/O modules [13]. For the purpose of this work we 
concentrated exclusively on the logic elements that compose 
the larger part of the FPGA resources [16].  
The RTG4 logic element consists of a 4-inputs Look-Up 
Table (LUT), a self-corrected Triple Modular Redundancy (S-
TMR) Flip-Flop and a dedicated carry chain as illustrated in 
the scheme reported in Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1.  The functional block diagram of logic element of the RTG4 Flash-
based FPGA family. 
 
The 4-LUT with carry chain logic can be configured to any 
4-input combinational function where the LUT output is 
XORed with the carry input signal (Cin). The output S is the 
principal output used when the LUT implements a 
combinational function. The carry chain has a specific 
hardwired interconnection between the logic elements able to 
reduce the propagation delay through the carry chain. The 
main innovation of the RTG4 logic cell consists in the SET-
mitigated asynchronous self corrected TMR-D Flip-Flop (S-
TMR). In particular each STMR Flip-Flop has an 
Asynchronous majority voter logic that ensures SEU 
immunity when the SET pulse width at the input D of the 
functional logic block is comprised within the user defined 
SET filtering delay coefficient (delay_sel). The RTG4 
implementation tools are used in order to set the mitigation 
properties. When the SET filtering is activated, the timing 
performances of the circuits can be drastically reduced. The 
degradation is proportional with the width of the SET delay.  
Whatever the RTG4 architecture provides the user 
definition of the SET filtering capability, the commercial tools 
are not able to provide the effective width of the SETs. In our 
approach we rely on the Single Event Transient Analyzer 
(SETA) approach for obtaining an effective estimation of the 
SET broadening through the logic paths. 
III. THE DEVELOPED SET MITIGATION MAPPER 
The developed environment consists on the diagram 
illustrated in Figure 2. In order to apply the proposed 
algorithm it is preliminary required to use a commercial-based 
tool chain able to generate a pre-layout netlist (EDIF netlist) 
where the netlist file contains the full functional description of 
the circuits using the RTG4 library cells. All the FPGA 
implementation tools commonly generate this file. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  The integrated implementation flow of the proposed SET mitigation 
mapper tool. 
Our method starts elaborating the EDIF netlist of the 
circuits by means of the SETA tool, which consist of an 
algorithm able to perform the exhaustive evaluation of SET 
effects on all the sensitive nodes of a circuit mapped on a 
Flash-based FPGA. Since the SETA tool requires the 
characterization of the FPGA cells in order to provide an 
accurate analysis, in the present work we generated a 
preliminary logic cells characterization by means of the post-
layout RTG4 simulation library. The results of the SETA tool 
are two profiles database: a SET sensitivity database including 
a broadening coefficient for each used resources and a 
database including the logic cone with shared logic gates.  
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Fig. 3.  A portion of mapped circuits where the progressive maximal SET 
broadening width contribution (ΔB) and the total SET broadening contribution 
(ΣB) are represented for each logic gate and routing segment. Please note that 
without any filtering scheme the maximal SET width at the input of the Flip-
Flop A and B is 2.1 ns and 1.8 ns respectively. 
 
An example of the information contained into the two 
databases is illustrated in Figure 3, where the broadening 
coefficients are provided for each logic gate as ΔBGi with i 
representing the gate index and for each routing net as ΔBRj 
 3 
with j representing a specific routing segment. Each 
coefficient is computed by the SETA tool as the maximal SET 
width observed by the SET pulse at the input of a given 
resource and it is measured in nanoseconds. A positive value 
corresponds to a broadening, while a negative value is related 
to the filtering of the SET. The database provides further 
information related to the entire broadening contribution of 
each logic path, represented by ΣB. The broadening 
contribution is calculated for each Flip-Flop element and for 
all the gates shared between two or more logical path. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the gate G3 has a maximal broadening 
contribution of 1.5 ns, which is calculated as the sum of the 
maximum broadening coefficient of the fan-in logic path. The 
Flip-Flops A and B have a maximal broadening contribution 
of 2.1 ns and 1.8 ns respectively.  
A. SET mitigation mapper 
Previously developed Flip-Flop-based SET filtering 
methods insert a guard gate logic structure on the input of the 
selected Flip-Flop [14]. By this way the Flip-Flop is filtering 
any type of SET reaching its input and having SET width 
lower than the filtering delay. This solution has two main 
disadvantages. The former is related to the need of insert the 
filtering scheme at the input of all the selected Flip-Flops 
provoking a drastic increase of the area overhead. The latter is 
related to the performance degradation, since the guard gate 
scheme requires not only a given number of gates to 
implement the SET-filtering scheme but also at least 4 gates 
for each Flip-Flop for implementing the guard-gate structure, 
as it is illustrated in Figure 4.a.  
The proposed mapper algorithm inserts the SET-filtering 
scheme illustrated in Figure 4.b for all logic gates shared 
between logic cones. The identification of the insertion point 
is performed by the SET mitigation mapper, which calculates 
the effective SET-filtering delay on the basis of the Flip-Flop 
SET filtering capabilities. As illustrated in Figure 5, the SET 
mitigation algorithm inserts a filtering scheme able to filter 
pulses having as maximal width 1.6 ns by inserting the proper 
filtering logic gates after the shared gate G3. As illustrated in 
the example of Figure 5, the filtering scheme nullifies any type 
of SET coming from the top part of the logic cones. On the 
other side the SET broadening contributions at the Flip-Flop A 
and B, are reduced to 0.6 and 0.3 ns, these SET widths can 
easily be filtered by the internal RTG4 register cell pulse 
filtering.  
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Fig. 4. Traditional Flip-Flop based guard-gate and SET-filtering solution (a) 
compared to the SET-filtering scheme inserted by the selective mapper on 
logic gates shared by logic cones (b) 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimental analysis of the proposed method has been 
performed on three different ITC’99 benchmark circuits 
implemented on a Microsemi RTG4 RT4G150-CG1657 Rad-
Hard Flash-based FPGAs [15]. The three benchmarks have 
been implemented in four different versions: original 
unhardened, commercial tool-based SET filtering (_SET), 
Flip-Flop-based guard-gate solution (_GG) and the proposed 
approach (_SEL_MAP). The circuit area characteristics are 
reported in Table I, we applied a guard gate mitigation of 1.5 
ns and the commercial tool has been settled to 0.6 ns.  
As it possible to notice, the proposed solution minimize the 
area overhead reaching an average of 25% with respect to the 
original circuit without mitigation. This percentage is 
extremely effective if compared with the guard-gate solution, 
which has as an overhead of about 135%. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  The proposed selective insertion of the SET-filtering scheme. Please note that the maximal SET of 0.6 ns on the Flip-Flop A and 0.3 ns on the Flip-Flop 
B are filtered by the internal RTG4 SET logic filtering. 
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Table I. Characteristics of the implemented circuits 
 
Besides, considering the timing characteristics of Table I, it is 
possible to observe that all the proposed techniques introduce 
a not negligible timing overhead. However, the proposed 
approach has a timing overhead lower than 10%. 
The SET mitigation capabilities have been evaluated by means 
of SET fault simulation. We evaluated the injection of 10,000 
SETs in random locations and sensitive nodes of the 
benchmark circuits. The SETs have been injected with a pulse 
width between 0.01 ns and 1.00 ns in all the possible sensitive 
points of the netlists. During the simulation-base fault 
injection the circuits have been stimulated with input random 
input patterns. The results have been classified as follow: SET 
provoking erroneous circuit behavior (Observed SET) and 
SET filtered. 
 
Table II. SET fault simulation results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it is possible to notice from the achieved results, the 
proposed solution performs a mitigation that is 4 times better 
the guard-gate solution. It is necessary to mention, that the 
actual results are related to the commercial solution that does 
not allow a SET filtering delay greater than 0.6 ns.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper we present a selective mapper tool for 
implementing SET resilient circuits on state-of-the-art 
radiation-hardened Flash-based FPGAs. The solution we 
propose is able to minimize the impact on the performances by 
reducing the area overhead and it is able to guarantee an 
optimal protection versus SET pulses. In particular our 
approach is able to mitigate SET one order of magnitude 
better than available solutions maintaining the area overhead 
within a reasonable level. As future research we plan to 
execute proton radiation test experiments to completely 
validate the proposed design method 
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Circuit 4LUTs 
[#] 
DFF 
[#] 
Area 
Overhead 
[%] 
Max 
Clock 
Period 
[ns] 
B05 205 46 - 10.49 
B05_SET 205 46 0 11.22 
B05_GG 481 46 134 16.31 
B05_SEL_MAP 255 46 24 12.10 
B12 378 119 - 8.47 
B12_SET 378 119 0 9.40 
B12_GG 1,092 119 189 15.45 
B12_SEL_MAP 502 119 33 9.82 
B14 1,607 216 - 21.14 
B14_SET 1,607 216 0 22.09 
B14_GG 2,903 216 81 28.44 
B14_SEL_MAP 1,895 216 18 22.20 
Circuit Observed 
SET [%] 
Filtered 
SETs [%] 
B05 85 15 
B05_SET 32 68 
B05_GG 12 88 
B05_SEL_MAP 1 99 
B12 87 13 
B12_SET 33 67 
B12_GG 16 84 
B12_SEL_MAP 3 97 
B14 89 11 
B14_SET 36 64 
B14_GG 15 85 
B14_SEL_MAP 3 97 
